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BOOK REVIEWS
FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL TAX CORRELATION. (Symposium
Conducted by The Tax Institute 1953 Princeton). Tax Institute,
Inc., 1954. Pp. 248.

$5.00.

This symposium, dealing with "the most compelling over-all problem" that faces the political scientist, "the problem of intergovernmental
relations," 1 reflects the grave difficulties encountered in seeking to deal
effectively with federal-state tax relationships. Twenty distinguished tax
administrators, students of public finance, lawyers, accountants and business men,2 trace the attempts made to deal with overlapping federal and
state taxes, grants made by the states to local governments and by the
federal government to the states, and the sharing of revenues collected by
the states with local governments.
The danger of conflict between federal and state taxing powers was,
of course, recognized when the Constitution was adopted.3 Until 1861,
no problem was presented in this area because the federal government
subsisted largely on its receipts from the tariff and the sale of public lands.
The Civil War saw the imposition of income and inheritance taxes and a
wide variety of excises by the federal government, but most of these levies
were discarded. The 1894 federal income tax was invalidated by the Su1. Sly, p. 1.
2. Kenneth W. Gemmill, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury; L. L.
Ecker-Racz, Fiscal Economist, United States Treasury Department; Selma J.
Mushkin, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education and Welfare;
J. H. Perry, Director of Research, Canadian Tax Foundation; M. H. Gopal, Professor of Economics, Andhra University, India; Alfred E. Driscoll, Governor of
New Jersey; Mabel Newcomer, Professor of Economics, Vassar College; Paul
Studenski, Professor of Economics, New York University; Arnold L. Edmonds,
Manager, Research Bureau, Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce; W. B.
Sanders, Tax Executive, Crown Zellerbach Corporation; Mortimer M. Kassell,
Deputy Commissioner and Counsel, New York State Department 6f Taxation and
Finance; Dixwell L. Pierce, Secretary, California State Board of Equalization;
Rowland Jones, Jr., President, American Retail Federation; William F. Counelly,
Connecticut State Tax Commissioner; Allen J. Goodrich, President, New York
State Tax Commission; Paul J. Strayer, Professor of Economics, Princeton University; Jesse R. Fillman, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn; George H. Kittendaugh,
Manager-Tax Accounting, General Electric Company; Carter T. Louthan, Mitchell,
Capron, Marsh Angulo & Cooney; and K. C. Littlefield, Manager, Tax Department,
Cities Service Oil Company.
3. Thus Alexander Hamilton stated in THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 194 (Lodge
ed. 1888):
"As far as an improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might
tend to render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a mutual
inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of power on either
side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a
manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and presumed,
however, that mutual interest would dictate a concert in this respect which
would avoid any material inconvenience." See Pierce, p. 151.
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preme Court 4 and the Spanish-American War federal death tax was imposed only for the emergency. Thus, until the advent of World War I,
federal revenues were largely confined to customs, which were forbidden to
the states, or to excises which the states had not used extensively5 And the
states and local governments relied almost exclusively on the property
tax, which was denied to the federal government by the constitutional
prohibition of direct taxes unless apportioned in accordance with population. 6
By 1952, however, the situation was radically altered; $79 billion in
revenues were collected by federal, state and local governments. Taxes
collected by federal and state or local governments, or both, overlapped in
many areas, as the following table shows: 7
Local
State
Federal
Tax
$80 million
$900 million
$28 billion
Individual income tax
$850 million*
$21 billion
Corporate income tax
$200 million
$800 million
Death and gift taxes
Excises and general
$9 billion
$6 billion*
sales taxes
* This includes a small amount of revenue collected by a
few local governments.
Recommendations and studies designed to prevent overlapping of
taxes have studded our history; indeed one paper covering twenty
pages in the symposium is designated as an "annotated bibliography" describing only the last ten years of such efforts 18 The milestone Groves
Report published in 1942 had recommended greater uniformity in federal
and state income tax bases, revision of the estate tax credit, federal collection of tobacco taxes to be shared with the states, the continued use of
liquor taxes by both the federal government and the states and the withdrawal of the federal government from gasoline taxation.9 It proposed
intensified cooperation in tax administration and the creation of a federalstate fiscal authority. This comprehensive report resulted in no legislation. In 1947 an equally comprehensive report, prepared by a Joint Committee of the American Bar Association, the National Tax Association, and
the National Association of Tax Administrators, recommended that taxes
on transfers of property during life and at death and those on gasoline,
motor vehicle registration, general sales, amusements and, admissions be
reserved for the states, which in turn should relinquish tobacco taxes for
4. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, rehearing, 158 U.S.
601 (1895).
5. Pierce, pp. 151-52.

6. U.S.
RELATIONS,

TREAsuRY DEPARTMENT, COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL
FEDEAL, STATE AND LocAL GOVERNMENT FIsCAL RELATIoNs 57

(1942).
7. See Gemmill, pp. 5-9.

8. Ecker-Racz, pp. 14-33.

9. See note 6 supra.
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exclusive federal use, but that both federal -and state governments continue to exploit liquor taxation.10 Again, no legislative action resulted
despite industrial state support for this program. Such efforts continuethe latest is the report of the Commission on Governmental Functions and
Fiscal Resources created at President Eisenhower's request. But the
fiscal and political difficulties standing in the way of a practical program of
allocating areas of taxation among the federal government and the states
are so imposing as to give little real hope of its actual adoption within the
foreseeable future.

The authors also deal with federal grants-in-aid to the states. There
is a long history of such grants, which played an important role through
land grants in the development of state universities and colleges, the
growth of our great highways and the development of a comprehensive
Such grants-in-aid typically begin by the
public assistance program."
grant of federal funds conditioned on the matching of the funds by the
states. School lunches, highways, hospital construction, health, natural

resources development and public welfare assistance have been aided
through such grants.' 2 Grants-in-aid are playing an increasingly important
role in our fiscal pattern and, indeed, constitute the most widespread and
far-reaching device being used for integrating the federal-state taxing
systems. Indeed, in view of the plight of most states and localities and
the growing pressures on them for added public services, if we are to
solve the critical inability of our bursting and inadequate educational system to meet the needs of a rapidly increasing school population and the
traffic congestion which is choking virtually every American city, federal
grants-in-aid would appear to be necessary on a vastly expanded scale.
The problems presented by federal grants-in-aid have recently been dramatized for the nation through the White House Conference on Education,
at which the need for federal funds to aid education was virtually universally recognized, but there was deep concern that grants of federal
funds might infringe on local control of the educational system, along
with sharp controversy as to how the funds should be allocated.13 Professor Newcomer makes a critical appraisal of the basic arguments against
grants-in-aid-that home rule is undermined and centralization of control
results, that there is a distortion of services provided and that wealth is
redistributed wastefully and spent irresponsibly; she concludes that despite
defects and dangers in grants-in-aid, the grant system is sound.14
The third general method of integrating federal and state tax systems (and state and local tax systems) discussed in the symposium is by
the sharing of revenues among various taxing agencies although collected
by a single taxing authority. This device has not been used by the federal
10. Ecker-Racz, p. 17.
11. N.ewcomer, pp. 91-94; Mushkin, pp. 34-44.
12. See note 11 supra.
13. See Straight, Schools: U.S. Emergency, New Republic, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 6.
14. Pp. 94-100. See, however, Professor Studenski's argument in Alternatives
to Grants in Aid, pp. 101-13.
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government (except to the extent that credits for state tax payments
allowed under the federal estate tax and unemployment insurance levies
may be regarded as sharing) but it has been used widely by the states,
which collect state-wide taxes that they share with local governments. A
major stumbling block impeding the development of tax sharing (this
problem is also presented in respect to grants-in-aid) is the basis for
sharing. If the source of collections is used as the basis for sharing, the
rich states or areas will receive the lion's share of the revenue badly
needed by the poorer states or areas.' 8 If population is to be the basis
of sharing, the richer areas are likely to oppose the use of their funds to
support poorer areas. Thus, the loud outcries annually heard in New
York City against the use of funds there collected by the state to aid
upstate rural areas would be greatly intensified if Mississippi farmers received the benefit of New York City collected funds. These problems,
together with the jealousy with which the states safeguard their taxing
powers, gives little immediate hope that wider tax-sharing of federally
collected revenues is either likely to be adopted on a large scale or that,
if adopted, it would seriously reduce overlapping federal and state taxes.1
The authors also refer to the noteworthy steps taken in integrating the
federal and state taxing systems at the administrative level. The magnitude of the administrative problem cannot be unduly emphasized. There
are over 150,000 taxing jurisdictions in the United States; some income
taxpayers must file three tax returns with varying determinations of
income and deductions. A nation-wide business may have to prepare and
file forty-eight different corporate tax returns and comply with widelyvarying sales tax regulations of thirty states and hundreds of cities, counties
and school districts. 17 Administrative reform is, therefore, of great importance. In this area significant improvements have been made through
the increasing adoption by the states of substantially the federal definition
of net income and in some cases the laying of state income taxes as a percentage of the federal levy; and in addition progress has been made in
cooperative auditing of certain taxes.
One other general area of intergovernmental relations discussed by
the writers deserves note, the area of interstate conflicts. Significant progress has been made in attempting through cooperative action of the
states to obtain greater standardization of formulas apportioning state
taxes measured by net income from business transactions. Largely as a
result of the scholarship and persistent prodding of the National Tax
Association, twenty-five of the thirty-five states which impose corporation
net income taxes have adopted the so-called Massachusetts formula; 18
15. Strager, pp. 196-98.

16. See Perry, Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements in Canada, p. 53;
Gopal, Union-State Financial Relations in India, p. 71. The interesting papers
dealing with the Canadian and Indian efforts to solve problems of intergovernmental
fiscal relations offered little help in solving our problems because they arose out
of different historical, political and economic backgrounds and needs.
17. Connelly, p. 188.
18. Kittendaugh, p. 207.
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much still remains to be done even in this area because, unfortunately, there
are a number of different methods for allocating sales by states using the
Massachusetts formula. 19 In the double domicile conflict, arising in death
tax cases, substantial progress has been made through the adoption of an
arbitration procedure for disposing of domicile conflicts.20 Also, where a
person lives in one state and works in another, reciprocal credits have
been devised to prevent duplicate taxation. 21
The speakers at the symposium, it is thus apparent, wrestled with
grave and formidable problems. And the writers have rendered a significant service in bringing together in one volume a statement of the basic
facts and a critical presentation and appraisal of the alternative solutions
to the problems of intergovernmental fiscal relations.
However, this reader closed the volume with a feeling that his high
expectations from the distinguished group assembled for the symposium
had not been completely fulfilled. Perhaps the group suffered from
severe space limitations, the papers consuming an average of about ten
pages each. One would have preferred to have had the number of papers
considerably reduced, in order to have furnished the authors a greater
opportunity to develop their views. This reader felt in a number of instances that he was being served an intellectual appetizer, which merely
whetted his appetite, and that the authors were cut short before they could
get into the meat of their analyses and proposals. Nevertheless, this vol..
ume should prove highly useful in the continuing search for effective and
politically practicable methods of cutting through the highly important and
equally tough problems of inter-governmental fiscal relations.
Jerome R. Hellersteinf

THE MORAL DECISION. By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. Pp. ix, 342. $5.00.
-Professor Edmond Calm, a profound legal philosoplier, aims this
book at laymen. His subject is morals. His method resembles law
school classroom discussion with this difference: he gleans moral rather
than legal knowledge from litigated cases. Before turning to this case
method Cahn orients his readers in a fifty-eight page apologia-the best
though not the easiest part of the book.
Cahn wants the motivating force and semantic push that characterizes
study of vivid cases.1 He claims another strength for his method. "How
19. Connelly , p. 186.
20. Id., pp. 207-08.
21. Id., pp. 185-86.
tfMember of the New York Bar; Associate Professor of Law, New York

University Law School.

1. His promise to enliven each moral issue by posing it in concrete form is not
always kept For, example, after stating and discussing for two pages a claim for
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often," he says, "when we cannot decide which of many alternative courses
is right, we find ourselves utterly certain that one particular course is
wrong." (p. 11).2 The dilemma, however, has four horns: (1) tangible
good works, (2) palpable misdeeds, (3) generic righteousness, and (4)
abstract evil. Concrete behavior can be adjudged legal and moral as well
as illegal and immoral. The nature of abstract wrongfulness is just as
general as the nature of abstract righteousness-especially in systems, like
Cahn's, recognizing most behavior to be neither especially good nor particularly evil.3
The book is not bare of abstractions about the nature of the good.
With a quick, wide look to the past, Cahn divides moralists into two classes:
"There are the ethical systems that emphasize the good as happiness, and
there are those that emphasize the good as righteousness." (p. 12). Then
follows a legalistic figure of speech, hard for laymen to understand:
"The operations of the good qua happiness tend to resemble those
of a successful administrativeprocess. They call more for judgment
in the sense of a human resource than a judgment in the sense of an
acquittal or condemnation. They call for expertness, adaptability, and
a talent for accommodation. . . . On the other hand, the good qua
righteousness invokes the incidents of a judicial process. It operates
like a court; it enjoins, it acquits or condemns."
Cahn continues:
"With this analogy in mind, the American lawyer might suggest
there are many moral problems that are best suited to an administrative disposition subject to a judicial review, that is, moral problems
that we may handle best by concerning ourselves primarily with values
in human happiness and by bowing to a rigorous mandate of conscience only when conscience can find no acceptable basis whatever
for the course we have chosen." (pp. 15-16).
This American lawyer's anonymity is thin; he sounds like Edmond Calm
who earlier abjured bold attempts to talk abstractly about the good.
His discussion of morals continues in legal metaphor. A "Moral
Constitution" and "Moral Legislation" affect moral decisions. (pp. 16-34).
The process of framing this moral constitution is not unlike that used by
natural law philosophers deducing precepts from the inherent nature of
marriage annulment made by Harry Sagainst Bessie who beguiled him into marriage, Cahn tires of these little people and their narrow dispute and embarks on
a thirteen page ramble about American attitudes on marriage, their historical antecedents, and heart balm suits. (pp. 94-110). A twelve page abstract discussion of
death and suicide is appended to a problem of the survivorship of Mark Twain's
rights in an unpublished manuscript. (pp. 232-43).
2. This recalls Cahn's SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949) in which he turned from
attempts to describe justice in favor of the definition of the unjust.
3. Cahn says: "Humanity being what it is and behaving as it does, an effective
ethical regime must reserve some intervals and recesses for conduct which is
morally neutral." (p. 163).
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man.4 Cahn's theory is that men can frame a moral constitution because
they all have three abilities: (1) they can stand off and judge themselves;
(2) they can put themselves in others' places and circumstances; (3)
they have in their biological equipment a sense of wrong.8 Cahn only
sketches in passing the articles of his Moral Constitution (p. 2 9)-a
smaller handful than, for instance, Hobbes' collection of general moral
precepts,0 but Hobbes comes to mind because he, like Calm, sums up in
the golden rule. Cahn's resemblance to natural lawyers should not turn
modem relativists too much against him for he is quick to say that wide
abstract precepts exert little force when specific moral decisions are
made. (p. 20).7
Cahn's "Moral Legislation" is more specific, more potent, and less
immutable. Tenets of a moral code are learned by children; this learning
starts and molds their consciences. But Cahn does not hold with those who

(like Savigny

8)

turn folkways into yardsticks of law and right. Though

society formulates and teaches children norms of conduct, each maturing
child reworks these norms into tools of self control. When he applies
the reworked norm to a specific moral problem, he "re-legislates" the
norm. So Calm rejects both the power and the propriety of moral authoritarianism. Lawyer-like, he says, "If what ultimately counts in the
moral process is the making of particular moral decisions then no one
can relieve us of that burden or deprive us of that power unless he makes
the concrete decision for us. . . ." (p. 25). 9 Still, of course, social
forces count. "Moral legislation" is produced by the group at work in
individuals. We see it in objective behavior because a subjective individual has enacted it in his conscience." (p. 31).
Many writers have dealt with the relation of law to morals, but Cahn's
comparison of law-in-action with morals-in-action throws light on the
structure of morality. Since law and morals solve the same kinds of
specific problems, moral tenets-like laws-are often flexible and instrumental. Calm puts it this way:
4. See, e.g., Jean Dabin, General Theory of Law, in THE LEGAL PHILosoPHIEs
OF

LASx,

RADBRUCH AND DABIN 225, 419 (1950).

5. This is his description of the sense of wrong: "Our reaction to an act of
moral wrong is a blend of reason that recognizes, of emotion that evaluates and of
glands that pump physical preparations for action. In a single combined response,
our muscles tighten and our judgment condemns, anger fills us with heat or our
spirits slide down with sorrow." (p. 18). Compare Cicero's ". . . there is really
no expiation for crimes against men or sacrilege against the gods. And so men
pay the penalty, not so much through decisions of the courts . .
but guilty
men are tormented and pursued by the Furies, not with blazing torches, as in the
tragedies, but with the anguish of remorse and the torture of a guilty conscience."
THE LAws bk. I, § 14, at 341 (Keys transl. 1928).
6..See Ho.BEs, LEVIATHAN CC. 14 and 15.
7. Even John Dewey, who insisted that ". . . ends arise and function within
action," DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 223 (1922), put unselfishness into
his system. "Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a
sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them." Id. at 331.
8. SAVIGNY, VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LzaIsLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE
(Hayword transl. 1831).
9. Does Freud give men "legislative power" over their own "super-egos"?
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"The real purpose of moral ideas is to teach; they are time-tested
tools for educating ourselves. Once we recognize this, the old static
diagram of commands and precepts changes before our gaze into a
fluid, moving process-similar to the process we observed in the
workings bf the law." (p. 41).
This conclusion will be rejected by uncomfortable liberals who, sensing
social needs for fluidity, are willing to cut law loose from immutability
but try to hold morals tight.'0 Not unnaturally, then, we find Calm believing with the Utilitarians that criteria for judging moral norms and
legal norms must be much the same:
"There are moral values in law and moral values outside the law;
the only practical difference between them is in the respective methods
by which they are enforced. Those who hold this view will insist
there is absolutely no formula of division by which one can determine
a priori where a specific moral value will be given its enforcement.
A moral problem may summon the sheriff, the school, the home, the
business association, the social group, the church, or any combination
of these, depending exclusively on how the community at that particular stage in its development has chosen to assign the functions of
prevention and punishment." (p. 47).1
And yet Calm does not belong entirely with the Utilitarians and their
pragmatist progeny. Dewey, for example, was happy to defend the Utilitarians against the charge that they exaggerated the role of rational thought
in human conduct,' 2 and his legal disciple Walter Wheeler Cook espoused
the view that "an application of scientific methods of inquiry to the field
of 'values' (ethics and politics, including law) will make our choices of
'ends' more intelligent, better grounded, less subject to caprice." 13 While
Cahn, too, avows ". . . the incessant moral duty to exercise intelligence" (p. 251), his system of morals uses science only as a handmaiden
and professes a moral technique differing from scientific method.
In two ways Cahn's moral decider differs from a scientific discoverer:
(1) The scientist steels himself against subjective, personal and emotional
10. For example Dabin, supra note 4, at 351, says, "The instrumental character
of law expresses a fundamental difference between law and morals . . . it would
be wrong to present the moral rule, even the positive moral rule laid down by an
external authority, as a mere means with a view to an end. . . . In reality moral
law, natural or positive, confines itself to translating the requests of the one and
only morality."
11. Cf. AUSTIN, LEcTuREs oN JuRIspRUDENcE 127 (3d ed., Campbell 1869):
"In so far as law and morality are what they ought to be . . . legal and moral

rules have been fashioned on the principle of utility." Mill in his Utilitarianism
says, "We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person
ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the
opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his con-

science." MILL, UTILIrAEANism 59 (Everyman's Lib. ed. 1863).
12. DEWEY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 221-22.
13. In the symposium My PHiLosoPHy or LAw 51, 59 (1941).
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reactions; he constantly tries to work only with calculated, cold, impersonal
reason. Cahn calls on the man wrestling with a moral problem to use his
"sense of wrong," defined to include emotional as well as rational parts.
"Wisdom," he poetically says, "is neither dry nor cold but moist and warm;
it resides not only in the head but throughout the body, in the veins, the
glands, and the dispositions -of nerve and muscle." (p. 252). (2) Science
functions on the authority of intellect and training; the hon-scientist has
no obligation to make his own scientific decisions beyond using judgment
to avoid quackery; the scientist with every reason to respect and no reason
to doubt a brother scientist often takes that brother's conclusions on faith.
But for Calm moral decisions are properly made only by those faced with
moral problems; they may not farm out their moral problems without
ducking responsibility, and they cannot farm them out except by turning
them over to a selected superior and becoming his puppet.
Calm is not a whole-hearted instrumentalist. Even though he views
some tenets, moral and legal, as tools, his morality includes some fixed
goals, goals to be worked toward as distinguished from tools for working
toward them. This is illustrated by his first concrete case. A seaman,
Holmes, was tried for his part in forcing fourteen men from an overcrowded life boat. The trial judge charged the jury that those thrown
overboard to save the rest should have been chosen by lot. Cahn, with
Kantian respect for man as an end in himself, disagrees: "[I]f none
sacrifice themselves of free will to spare the others-they must all wait
and die together." (p. 71). There is a beautiful rejection of scientific
quantification in Cahn's moral alchemy by which he transforms man into
humanity. "Whoever saves one, saves the whole human race; whoever
kills one, kills mankind." (p. 71).14
Clarence Morris t

SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER, A QUAKER SEARCH FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENCE. American Fiends Service
Committee, 1955. Pp. vii, 71. $.25.
Commencing in 1949 the American Friends Service Committee has
issued a series of studies on international peace. The previous studies
have addressed themselves to specific suggestions for reducing tension and
have only obliquely challenged the basic reliance upon force as the cornerstone of American policy and international politics in general. Speak
Truth to Power addresses itself to the whole concept of military strength
arid the concept of force, and thus it constitutes an exposition of the pacifist
viewpoint of the Quakers.
14. For a less Kantian view condemning instrumentalism as inadequate, compare Fuller, in My Pamosory oF LAw 113, 118-25 (1941).
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
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The book, however, is not an official publication of the Religious
Society of Friends, but was prepared for the executive board of the American Friends Service Committee by a committee of thirteen individuals of
considerable prominence in Quaker affairs and was approved by the executive board for publication. In fact, this slender pamphlet may be taken
as a most comprehensive, albeit compressed, exposition of the Quaker
world-view as applied to the international world of our times.
The seventy pages of this pamphlet are so distilled and so spare and
cogent that a summary of argument cannot do justice to the full brief.
The premises upon which this concept of non-violence is based are familiar
enough; Christian literature abounds in such exposition and it has been the
traditional Quaker witness for several centuries. The world, and particularly the West, believing that an end which at any given juncture in history
appears to be good can be achieved by means which are known to be abominable, has regarded this concept as irrelevant. Speak Truth to Power is a
most cogent and compelling argument for its preeminent relevance. Although a religious insight is at its base, the pamphlet is not concerned with
the religious concept per se but rather with the world-view which it engenders and the practical application of that view.
The initial analysis of the world scene, of the evils and paradoxes inherent in the American response based upon military power, is perceptive
and scarcely admits of serious disagreement. The shortcomings of the
"security" of mutual terror, which are apparent to all, and the growth of
the Leviathan state-security conscious and ubiquitous-are inevitable byproducts of this response. The writers contend that the American response
has been inadequate and they claim that it has actually fostered the influence of the Soviet Union and the appeal of communist doctrines; that
it has confirmed the Marxist doctrine within communist countries; that
it has resulted in a steady erosion of the values which distinguish us from
the communist world. The latter is said to include the spawning, to at
least some degree, of all of those characteristics traditionally associated
with totalitarianism: spying on fellow citizens; anonymous denunciations;
restrictions on freedom of movement, speech and assembly; persecution
for beliefs unaccompanied by acts; the weakening of the presumption of
innocence; the militarization of society; the confusion of dissent with disloyalty; the breakdown of the integrity of denotative language (e.g., the
phrase "the free world" to include totalitarian states not under Soviet control) ; and finally the constant increase in the concept of the infallibility of
the state in matters of internal and external security. As a consequence,
our moral standards have been debased to the point that a doctrine like
massive retaliation produces some political carping but scarcely a ripple of
moral revulsion.
One reason for the sober and respectful consideration with which
Quaker criticism is and has been received is that Quakers, themselves, do
not fall into the same beguiling "devil" theory in regarding these phenom-
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ena as they decry in the American response .to Russia. They do not find
conspiracy in high places or Machiavellian motives on the part of our
leaders. On the contrary they find that all of our moves, fully debated, have
been taken in good faith and in the belief that they would lead to peace.
Nor, of course, have the Quakers ever succumbed to the blandishments of
parlor pacifism-the widespread delusion of the Twenties and Thirties that
war could be done away with by publicizing its horrors in four-color ads
and by preventing little boys from playing with tin soldiers, without attending to the difficult problems of the world. Furthermore, the pacifist concept here advanced is not to be confused with "return to normalcy" or
isolationism.
The thesis is advanced that the enemy is not the Soviet Union or communism but certain beliefs and actions common, to a degree, to both the
East and the West-lust for power, materialism, atheism, the ubiquitous
state and the cult of violence. The study recognizes that there does exist
a moral basis in the East-West conflict: the Judaeo-Christian philosophy
of man's innate worth and dignity (which, however inchoate, unrealized
and diluted, is still part of the political and cultural tradition of the West)
as opposed to the avowed materialism, atheism and authoritarianism of
the Marxist-Leninist world-view. In fact it is this very moral basis to
which they would have us adhere and, at long last, put into practice. The
Quakers see the centuries-old dichotomy in Western society between this
ethic and the practice of violence as a dualism possible only when war and
the preparation for war make only partial demands. They see this era as
drawing to a close now that security based on violence involves total
participation and total destruction.
The study proceeds to recount Quaker experience with non-violent
techniques in the fields of prisons, the insane, slavery, the social sciences
and in international and intercultural conflicts from William Penn's experience with the American Indian to the non-violent revolution in British
India. From this experience the Quakers proceed to a specific, nonutopian and non-mystical explanation of the practical policy of non-violence.
The study delineates the difficult but unmiraculous pattern of non-violent
resistance. This is no soft-headed daydreaming, nor are there overtones of
martyrdom or a morbid preoccupation with other-worldliness.
The plea is directed primarily to individual commitment to non-violence, and the fulfillment of the promise which is held for this course presupposes such conviction by great numbers of people. Governmental
change of policy is inconceivable without this change in conviction. The
writers aver that the renunciation of violence by America would realize
a vast potential, and they claim that any nation in this fear-ridden age
which had the courage to trust this fundamental Christian precept and,
indeed, to trust completely the democratic process instead of placing faith
in the illusory security of an atomic stockpile, would speak with undreamed
power to enslaved men the world over. Thus the great social revolutions in
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progress in the uncommitted one-third of the world could be supported and
not opposed and would cease to look to communist nations for support.
Thus also expanded programs of technical and economic assistance could be
carried on, not unilaterally but under United Nations auspices, and with a
greatly multiplied effect by reason of not being a subsidiary maneuver in
the military power struggle, which it must be acknowledged, such programs
are and have been. The study concludes that it is only when material
power has been rejected as the basis for security that men can give both
unreserved and responsible support to the claims of justice internally and
throughout the world. "We suggest that from now on, peace will not be
for the strong, but for the just, and further, that there will neither be peace
until men learn to be just, nor justice until men determine to renounce
violence." (p. 41).
The pamphlet thus argues that a change of attitude in the direction
of non-violence would produce a world climate in which mutual disarmament could be effected and bring into being world situations in which actual
rather than illusory "positions of strength" could be created. But the
argument concedes that in the last analysis pacifism would logically require unilateral disarmament. In this event, if hatred has gone so far
that even a revolutionary policy of peace could not prevent international
aggression, a disarmed nation would not passively permit an invader to
enslave it, as is so often believed of pacifist policy. On the contrary, it
would carry on a constant program of non-violent resistance in which
there would be total non-cooperation with the invader. Trains would not
be run to transport troops, ships would not be unloaded, factories would not
be operated to produce military supplies, etc., while a policy of good will
toward the individual invading soldier would be maintained. Quakers,
who have always lived dangerously, recognize that this would likely result
in mass reprisals and ultimately in many deaths, but, it is rejoined, not so
many as would result from H-bombs. And, more important, the policy
would ultimately prevail and the moral basis of society would not be extinguished as it would surely be in the total war which our present policy
necessarily envisages as a last resort.
In short, both the present American policy and the Quaker policy
assert that the "last resort" of each will not come to pass if the respective
policies are pursued with vigor and skill. The Quakers say that the present
policy has not been a success and that, moreover, its last resort-total waris worse, morally and practically, than the Quakers' last resort-occupation
fought with methods of non-violent resistance.
Few will read this pamphlet without being compelled to a reexamination of the moral basis of international policy. But few will be convinced
that, risk for risk, the admittedly perilous course of military security and
the immoral and anti-democratic attitudes which it spawns are not safer
than the perils of unilateral disarmament. It is true, as the Quakers contend, that the policy has resulted neither in real peace nor real security.
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On the other hand, it has not resulted in real war or in complete lack of
security. We have somehow gotten through the first decade of the era of
mutual terror and few will be persuaded to exchange this precarious security to flee to dangers which they know not of.
This study was completed and approved for publication prior to
Geneva. Assessment of Geneva is still premature and perhaps presumptuous here. May it not be imagined, however, that historians will see it as
a mutual renunciation of violence in a limited area? Did not the Soviet
Union and the United States there agree that their mutual enmity and
distrust were to continue, and that each regarded the situation in general
and the posture and actions of the other as intolerable, but that neither
would employ force to eliminate these "intolerable" situations? It is a
part of the Quaker argument that absolute weapons have made the pacifist
approach .the only practical solution, as well as the only moral one; the
same factors would appear to have been operating in disguise at Geneva.
Henry W. Sawyer, III t
f Member of the Philadelphia Bar; Councilman-at-Large, City of Philadelphia.
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